Support for El Sisi Means More Work for Egypt's Military [The National]
January 30, 2014
Three years ago, the Egyptian military met in Cairo without their formal commander-in-chief, then president Hosni Mubarak. The military were rattled and had been taken off guard by the revolutionary sentiment coursing through Cairo’s streets.
Over the following 18 months, under Field Marshal Hussein Tantawi’s guidance, the military maintained their popularity among the overwhelming majority of the Egyptian population.
Shortly after Ahmad Shafiq, the military’s preferred candidate, lost to Mohammed Morsi in the 2012 presidential elections, Field Marshal Tantawi retired and Abdel Fatah El Sisi became the new head of the supreme council of the armed forces.
Mr Morsi was removed from office last year, with the claim by the military that it was responding to popular will. Reliable opinion poll data collected prior to that suggested that, even after its involvement in Mr Morsi’s removal, the popularity of the military would have remained high, although it would have lost the support of Mr Morsi’s followers.
With that support, the military was able to cultivate the impression among the public that while it guaranteed Egypt’s new post-Morsi political arrangement, it was not actually responsible for governing the country. As such, while there have been many complaints around security and the economy in the last six months, such complaints have been left at the prime minister’s door and the military has been largely let off the hook.
If responsibility for governance, at least in the majority of the Egyptian public’s perception, is not currently being laid to rest at the feet of the military, how will those opinions change if Field Marshal El Sisi runs for president?
Since the beginning of the revolution, and for plenty of time before that, the Egyptian military has not had to pay a substantial price for the support it receives from the public. This, however, may be about to change. In the past, the military has often been seen to guarantee political arrangements – but it has not been seen by most Egyptians as creating them.
This week’s events change that dynamic entirely. Field Marshal El Sisi was promoted to the highest possible rank and the military council openly endorsed the option of him running for president. Indeed, their statement almost indicated that not running could be interpreted as shirking a national responsibility.
If Field Marshal El Sisi does run, as most expect he will, it may be seen as a contest entered into by an entire institution rather than an individual.
It could be that the majority of the public begins to see the military as having a direct and open presence in Egypt’s political arena. Certainly, that would give Field Marshal El Sisi an advantage over any other candidate in presidential elections.
However, it is also a double-edged sword – for it means that should Field Marshal El Sisi fail to deliver on the expectations of the Egyptian public as president, his failures would be viewed as a failure of the entire military.
Egypt faces a number of critical challenges – political polarisation, security threats, economic instability and a population that demands to see other dividends from the political tumult of the past three years.
It may very well be that an El Sisi presidency, so openly backed and endorsed by the military establishment, could have sufficient political capital to address at least some of those issues, but even in that scenario there remains two key questions.
The first is: would such a presidency have the political wisdom to address those questions effectively and appropriately?
And the second: if it does not succeed, what will that then mean for the popular standing of the military institution itself? At this point, no one is quite sure. Not even the examples of history can help answer that question.
Dr HA Hellyer is an associate fellow at the Royal United Services Institute in London, and the Brookings Institution in Washington DC
On Twitter: @hahellyer
Source: The National
