Withdrawal of Qatari Ambassadors Points to Deep Frustration [The National]
March 6, 2014
On Wednesday, Saudi Arabia, the UAE and Bahrain withdrew their ambassadors from Qatar. It is an unprecedented step taken by GCC states towards a member state, and an escalation that was unexpected. But it does not come completely out of the blue. The question now is, how should this rift be dealt with.
Over the last few years, Qatar has taken a different stance from other GCC countries on a number of regional issues. The initial motivations seemed to be aimed at expanding Doha’s sphere of influence regionally, but the end result of that influence was unclear. Still, such stances did not lead to much public tension between Doha and other capitals in the Gulf.
The tensions, however, have come to a head in the past year. Before this incident, disagreements among GCC states tended to be dealt with privately, through high level and direct contacts. Issues had been resolved in this fashion, but this policy started to change with regards to Qatar recently.
Qatar disagrees with other Gulf countries on a number of regional issues, from its approach to the Syrian crisis – albeit marginally – to the civil strife in Yemen. But what has particularly been the source of strain is Qatar’s stance towards the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt and elsewhere.
The removal of former Egyptian president Mohammed Morsi last year by the Egyptian military exposed this very well. Qatar recognised the new Egyptian political authority, unlike Turkey but, at the same time, it pursued a policy that was independent from other Gulf countries.
Doha welcomed Brotherhood and pro-Brotherhood Islamists who fled Egypt after Mr Morsi was deposed. It was from Doha that pro-Brotherhood preacher Yusuf Al Qaradawi not only publicly attacked the post-Morsi administration but also, significantly, other GCC members that supported that administration.
After Al Qaradawi’s statements towards the UAE, the Qatari envoy to Abu Dhabi was summoned by the Emirati authorities, as it was assumed Al Qaradawi would not have been able to make such statements without a green light from the Qatari authorities. Summoning the Qatari ambassador indicated an escalation, as it is something that is extremely rare within the context of internal GCC relations. It was a clear sign of a deep frustration.
For a time after Mr Morsi’s removal, it seemed that Doha, after the ascendancy of Sheikh Tamim bin Hamad Al Thani, might reconsider its foreign policy orientation particularly towards the Brotherhood. There were some signals to that effect, and it was reported that the Egyptian interim president, Adli Mansour, and Sheikh Tamim met for the first time in Abu Dhabi, indicating the possibility of more than simply an official acceptance of the new status quo in Egypt.
Certainly, the UAE and Saudi Arabia expected that Qatar would not only rethink its Egypt approach, but also its broader perspective on the Brotherhood. While Doha hosts pro-Brotherhood Islamists and Brotherhood figures, Abu Dhabi and Riyadh perceive the Brotherhood as a deeply threatening transnational force that affects not only its ally in Egypt but also has impacts within the Gulf itself.
Media in the UAE and Saudi Arabia have attacked the Brotherhood on a number of levels – in contrast, Qatari media has provided a platform for supporters of the Brotherhood.
It is clear that Saudi Arabia and the UAE in particular among GCC states were infuriated by Qatar’s nonconformist foreign policy orientation. But the tensions seemed to be contained through a high level agreement signed in November that presumably would have had effects on Doha’s approach towards the Brotherhood. Clearly, however, the implementation of this agreement by Doha has not been carried out to the full satisfaction of Riyadh or Abu Dhabi, leading to a stormy meeting between the GCC members on Tuesday evening. Early on Wednesday, the ambassadors were withdrawn.
The Qatari leadership was probably taken by surprise by the move, and will now be looking for a way to navigate through this extraordinary situation.
Since its inception, the GCC has been dominated by Saudi Arabia. If Qatar seeks to outmanoeuvre Riyadh, it will require allies. That is not likely – Abu Dhabi and Manama are clearly aligned with the Saudi position, and Oman does not appear to be interested in supporting Doha against Riyadh. Kuwait said it would not withdraw its ambassador in Doha partly to be play a mediating role, and so it will not intervene in favour of Qatar’s position. Qatar is, it seems, on its own within the GCC.
But for Qatar, this is not only a regional issue. It also has domestic aspects. Within Doha itself, there is a discussion about how the country should proceed in the post-Arab uprising world, particularly given the fortunes of the Brotherhood in Egypt, and the political standing of the Brotherhood in Libya and Syria.
Will this diplomatic spat cause the Qataris to rally behind a defiant position, or will it strengthen the hand of that faction within Doha that has wanted to re-evaluate Qatar’s foreign policy? That might involve the departure of pro-Brotherhood figures from the country. The coming days and weeks will see the answer to that question. If that happens, it may have significant repercussions for not only Doha, but the Brotherhood regionally and globally.
Dr HA Hellyer is an associate fellow at the Royal United Services Institute in London, and the Brookings Institution in Washington DC
On Twitter: @hahellyer
Source: The National