US relations with Egypt: one problem at a time [AL-MONITOR]
April 15, 2015
President Barack Obama’s recent decision to end the halt on sending military equipment to Egypt, resulting in the release of aircraft, missiles and tank kits, took many by surprise. The recent court decision in Egypt that led to a life sentence for Egyptian-American citizen Mohamad Soltan on charges of funding a pro-Mohammed Morsi sit-in and "spreading false information" — charges criticized by Amnesty International — reinforced doubt about the American-Egyptian funding relationship. But the military funding issue is somewhat more complicated than that — and may need to be investigated further, for both American and Egyptian interests, going forward.
On the one hand, Egypt has fallen, tremendously, in terms of being a priority for the Washington Beltway in general and the Obama administration in particular. Part of this is due to fatigue, after seeing what appeared to have been a majority of Egyptians turn against the Muslim Brotherhood when it was in power, and embrace the military-led ouster of a deeply flawed but democratically elected president.
Another part of it is the shifting geopolitical realities in the region, where Egypt is, correctly, identified as being in a more stable state than Syria, Iraq or Libya. Alignments against the Islamic State (IS) also play a role, as do the broader genuine security considerations that the Egyptian state has; while Washington might think Egypt's tactics in the Sinai Peninsulaand elsewhere are counterproductive, the Obama administration does not think Cairo’s security concerns are unfounded.
Finally, there is the "bandwidth" issue in DC, where the administration cannot focus heavily on too much at once, despite the resources at its disposal. This has meant that other issues of importance, such as the Russian annexation of Crimea, as well as the framework for the Iran deal, have stolen a lot of attention from a policy establishment that generally suffers from attention deficit disorder. On the other hand, even those who do focus on Egypt at all within the administration have been arguing about which way to move forward, making any unified policy difficult.
Given those realities, the resumption of aid was probably a foregone conclusion. A review had been underway, and until the review was completed, the issue of aid was constantly on the agenda in any meeting with Egyptian officials at varying levels.
Privately, many American officials argued that the withholding of aid was a tool that gave nothing in return, except for hassle, as Egyptian officials and their friends from other regional partners constantly raised the issue. On the flipside, some also pointed out such an action had to be given time in order to show it was or was not effective. In the end, however, the former camp won, and argued it was time to "clear the decks" as it were, particularly as other priorities in the region would necessitate coordination with the Egyptians.
The "clearing of the decks," nevertheless, was not so clear after all. The Egyptian authorities were certainly not expecting for cash-flow financing to be touched — a mechanism that essentially allows the Egyptian state to purchase weaponry on credit. It is an arrangement that, hitherto, belonged to only two states in the world — Egypt, and Israel. When the Obama administration mentioned it would "modernize" the relationship, what it essentially seems to have meant is the cutting of cash-flow financing as soon as possible — in this case, 2018.
But this is not as sudden as one might think. The issue of cash-flow financing has been raised since 2012, when a number of Americans were put on trial in Egypt for nongovernmental organization activity. More than a few congressional members were startled by briefings that the cancellations of such contracts would involve huge financial penalties borne by the US taxpayer. That locked the US into an arrangement that meant any American administration would be straitjacketed, at least in a way. From that point on, momentum has been building within the Beltway on the issue. The Egyptians are less than pleased, but it is rather unlikely that the next administration is going to change this decision.
The question, therefore, becomes one around timing: Why did the Obama administration decide to release the aid at this particular time? There are a number of factors that might explain it. The most likely explanation is a combination of them.
The framework for the Iran deal was released at about the same time (April 2) and that took a lot of attention off the military aid release. Moreover, the release sent a particular political message to several Arab Gulf states such as Saudi Arabia that their ally, Egypt, got something at the same time: weapons they had been asking for for some time. Simultaneously, the intensified Yemen crisis — which Egypt is now involved in as part of the broader Saudi-led coalition — may have also been less than coincidental. Others may argue that the process within the White House was simply completed at that particular time. In truth, probably all of these factors played a role in the timing.
None of this, nevertheless, answers the rather big question, particularly as an Egyptian-American citizen is sentenced to life imprisonment. Even though the sentence will be appealed, and will probably be changed, the question remains: What kind of relationship is the Egyptian-American one? Is it based on short-term, reactionary, ad hoc considerations? Or long-term, strategic, mutually beneficial gains?
The harsh truth may be that it is neither of those things. This is the same in Cairo as it is in Washington, DC, albeit for entirely different reasons. Neither of these capitals will cease engaging with each other at the highest levels. Since the beginning of the Obama presidency, the Egyptian file has never been dealt with in a strategic manner, with a full-fledged policy, with considerations for the short, medium and long term. That is probably unlikely to change during his presidency. The next administration, which is not so far away, will hopefully take on board the failings of the relationship so far, and consider structuring a relationship that looks far beyond a few months at a time.
Source: Al-Monitor
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