X-Raying Egypt's Policy [Afkar-Ideas]
March, 2014
It has been more than three years since crowds began to descend upon Tahrir Square in the centre of Cairo, sparking the beginning of an uprising in Egypt. Three years later, the country’s political realities have morphed and shifted – but while a revolution might have begun in that square, it has not been completed. Indeed, three years on, it is difficult to see how the major goals of that revolution have been approached, much less achieved. Where, then, does that leave the political arena of this country, at the centre of the Arab world, affecting not only that region but also the international community at large?
At the turn of 2011, the political landscape of Egypt was hardly transparent – but three years on, it is far more obvious than ever before. There are parts that remain elusive to the public eye, but broadly speaking, one can speak of the following parts, as they relate to the new, post-Morsi, constitutional arrangements and ‘war on terror’ paradigm.
The first is what has commonly, but rather unhelpfully, described as the ‘deep state’. The second is the military leadership and apparatus. The third is the oppositional Islamist groupings that do not accept the new constitutional arrangements. The fourth are those Islamist coalitions that do recognise the efficacy of the post-Morsi arrangements. They’re followed by the non-Islamist political groupings that remain supportive not only of the new constitutional arrangements, but uphold the ‘war on terror’ narrative. The final grouping is made of the alliances (mostly non-Islamist) that recognise the effects of the new constitutional arrangements, but reject the ‘war on terror’ frame.
The concept of the ‘deep state’ is problematic owing to a number of conceptual and theoretical issues. For the purposes of this piece, nevertheless, it relates to the coalitions and alliances within the state bureaucracy, security components in particular, and business interests outside of the bureaucracy that formed the backbone of the Mubarak regime. Following the uprising that saw Mubarak’s removal by the military’s leadership on February 11th 2011, these coalitions were put on the back-foot. They, just as much of the country, were taken by surprise, and were rather reserved for a year, given the public atmosphere. This changed in the run up to the presidential election of 2012, where they backed (almost successfully) Mubarak’s last prime minister, Ahmad Shafiq. Lively during Morsi’s reign, they supported the ‘Tamarod’ campaign that sought early presidential elections, and actively backed the army’s overthrow of Morsi following widespread protests. They are now in the process of trying to situate themselves in a new power structure, with most backing the presidential run of Field Marshal Abdel Fattah el-Sisi, and vigorously in support of the ‘war on terror’, with little or no regard for the deleterious effects endemic therein with regards to political pluralism and respect for civil liberties.
The military leadership has been a noted player in Egypt’s politics since 1952. The 2011 uprising did not displace it. Even though the uprising also took it by surprise, the leadership attempted to leverage the uprising for other purposes. It’s support base has been the envy of the country’s political forces – public confidence in it varied from 95% to around 80% from the beginning of the revolution until Morsi’s ouster, according to repeated Gallup polls and the independent Tahrir Trends survey. It is likely that after Morsi’s removal, confidence dropped – but considering it was 95% just prior to then, and the unpopularity of the Brotherhood and Morsi was so high, it is still probable that confidence in the military accounts for an overwhelming majority of the country’s population. It has, however, taken something of a chance in recent weeks, by openly backing (even almost mandating) Field Marshal El-Sisi for his prospective run to become president. Should El-Sisi fail to succeed in meeting public expectations, part of the public’s anger will likely fall upon the military, as it is clear that el-Sisi was the military’s candidate. However, all indications point to the fact that the military will back el-Sisi with not just rhetorical support but financial support, at least for the first part of his term – which may delay, or even defuse, a backlash for some time.
Islamist groupings that do not accept the new constitutional arrangements are centred within the ‘Anti-Coup Alliance’, and led by the Muslim Brotherhood. The Brotherhood have borne the brunt of the security crackdown since the ouster of Morsi on July 3rd, and their political cadres in the first, second, and third tiers are either in jail or in exile. Some of the four tier are also being detained – either through being swept up during the repressing of protests, or prior to that owing to accusations of conspiracies against the state and other such allegations. Their political efficacy, however, is questionable. Since early August, and especially since the violent dispersal of the pro-Morsi sit-ins on the 14th of August that led to at least a thousand civilian deaths, the Brotherhood has ceased to be a significant player in political terms. It plays a disruptive role by providing political cover for the protests, but it is unclear that it actually directs those protests or could do so. The Alliance is already seeing signs of disagreement from within, as those who are tempted to recognise the new constitution as effective (even if they would have preferred it not exist) may run in parliamentary elections later this year. Other Islamist groupings on the margins who reject the current constitutional set up have taken up violence as the tool to change Egypt’s political make up – the most famous of these is the ‘Ansar Bayt al-Maqdis’ group that has claimed responsibility for most of the militant attacks. Those attacks have mainly been focused on the police and the army, but recently targeted foreign tourists as well.
Not all Islamists are opposed to the new post-Morsi arrangement, however. The Nour Party, which is the main Salafi political grouping, recognized and supported the military’s removal of Morsi from the first day, and actively lobbied for the passing of the post-Morsi constitutional amendments earlier this year. It shan’t be running a presidential candidate, but is due to participate in parliamentary elections later this year. It is difficult to predict what sort of showing it might be able to pull off, considering the election law has not yet been released. It will certainly make a difference, whether the parliamentary elections will be organized around a list-based system, or an individual candidate based system. Nevertheless, either way, it seems clear that the Nour Party will play a role in the incoming parliament – the question is how large that role may be. It could be as large as 30% or as little as 5% - and no-one will know how its political stratagems to date, which have been remarkably pragmatic, rather than ideological, have paid off till then.
Others who have backed the new constitutional arrangements within the political party establishment include most of the non-Islamist political party spectrum. Moreover, most within that arena have backed, almost entirely, the ‘war on terror’ narrative, even though some are trying to push back, somewhat, against a return of what they identify as ‘security state’ practices. There are some prominent members of those political parties, that have rejected the ‘war on terror’ paradigm, but they continue to be weak and unable to effect a great deal of political change. This may change in the coming months, but if so, they will have to deal with new elements on the political party scene, made up of ‘deep state’ supporters, re-entering the political party arena through the formation of newer parties. It is unclear if they will be able to accomplish this.
The final grouping is made of the alliances (mostly non-Islamist) that recognise the effects of the new constitutional arrangements, but reject the ‘war on terror’ frame. They, ironically would have been the most critically responsible for launching the revolution three years ago, but are among the most vulnerable beneficiaries of that revolution at present. These alliances include certain parts of the media, political and civil rights activists, and some within political parties. However, due to their opposition to the ‘war on terror’ narrative, their criticism of the authorities, and rejection of the pro-Morsi ‘Anti-Coup Alliance’, they’re in an extremely marginalized position in the contemporary political set-up. Pro-Morsi advocates condemn them as being insufficiently oppositional to the military, which this groups counters by pointing out the Brotherhood’s convergence with the military’s interests until Morsi’s ouster. The pro-military camps accuse this grouping of being a ‘fifth column’ and subversive. It is unlikely that this grouping will be able to play an effective and constructive role in the near future with regards to actual political developments, given its lack of critical mass on the ground, and the public polarization between pro-Morsi and pro-military elements.
In three years, Egypt has seen two presidents ousted and three constitutional referenda. In the coming months, Egyptians are likely to see the second parliament in four years, and a fifth presidential authority in four years. Stability in this country remains as the foremost public concern for the overwhelming majority of the population – but it also remains to be the most elusive desire to satisfy.
Original Spanish Version: Afkar-Ideas
Photo: Amir Makar